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From: 数据恢复
Date: 11 Dec 2004
Time: 19:44:19
Remote Name: 219.133.183.216
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From: Ijaz Khan
Date: 22 Sep 1998
Time: 05:32:41
Remote Name: 210.56.15.7
Taliban, Iran and Pakistan: A New Twist in The Great Oil Game By Ijaz Khan Assistant Professor Jubilation over the collapse of Watan Party government in 1992 must not be forgotten, while celebrating the take over of almost the whole of Afghanistan by Taliban in that unfortunate country. If some one thinks they have at long last won the battle for Afghanistan, they are living in fool's paradise and ignorant of history as well as current geo-political situation of the region. Our high flying Afghan policy managers, whether in office or out of it, must try to remember where are the earlier Mujahideen heroes for whose training they are squabbling to take credit, before they indulge in the same about Taliban.. One basic requirement of a successful Foreign Policy is that there must always be a set of alternatives available. A good diplomat would never permit a situation where he can be cornered. Diplomacy is simply a game of give and take in which a state uses all its skills and strengths to play for maximum gains. Diplomatic skills always directly correspond to the power and strength that is available to back it. In a balance of power system [modified and developed but still a relevant and appropriate description of the international system] gains balance each other in such a manner that it results in enough gains for all, most important being peace. Anyone seen as going for total gain invites resistance from all those who perceive, rightly or wrongly that gain to be at their expense. That common perception means grouping of these against the apparent gainer, whose apparent victory leads to isolation and thus loss rather than gain. Victory is not just taking every thing one can. It must be clear to every one that nothing is without a price. There are no free lunches. So even if you are capable of taking something you sometimes do not because the price is too high. If some one really believes that Americans could not have won the Vietnam war or Russians their Afghan folly, then they are simply not reading the whole story and are unable to correctly interpret history. Similar was the reason for the British failure to colonize Afghanistan The simple reason was that the cost of winning those wars for the above states was simply much more than they were worth to these powers. This is not undermine the role of the bravery and heroism of the people of these countries, whose determination was to a large extent if not the only reason of the increase in the cost of victory to the extent of making them negatively attractive in terms of cost-benefit ratio. Simply take an example of a well to do man, who likes cars. An intelligent man would balance his love for cars with his and his family's other needs as well. He will never spend all his resources on simply buying an expensive car that he can pay for, but at the expense of his other needs. Your desires and needs must always be balanced by your resources. Simply, you would not pay more than a one or two Rupees for a box of matches even if you are very rich man and can afford to pay hundred rupees for it. Central Asia that comprises Afghanistan and five of former soviet republics Tajikistan, Kazakstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrghistan, holds significance to the world community mainly due to it being part of the Caspian Sea region. That region has attracted another great Energy rush after the Middle East. Afghanistan is a part of this latest 'great game' for oil and gas. Pakistan's Afghan policy is driven by her desire to participate in that game in an effective manner. That game is making strange bedfellows. Islamic Republic of Iran, Armenia, Russia, India and Tajikistan, see their interests as overlapping and are co-ordinating their policies accordingly. Kazakstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrghistan appears to be closer to the above described eemrging regioonal gruoping.. Turkey though historically suspicious of Russia and currently not on rather friendly terms with Iran, is increasingly being driven by the rapidly changing regional situation towards the above described alliance. Turkmenistan is still keeping itself away from these alignments. Peoples Republic of China is another very significant player in this game, with stakes that she would not easily give up. Azerbaijan and Iran have differences that can not be overcome easily. There are more Azerbaijanis in Iran than in Azerbaijan. The desires of Azerbaijanis to be united with Azerbaijan is something with which Iran can not be comfortable. Then there are differences about the rights to exploit the energy resources of Caspian Sea. United states America find itself drawn closer to Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. However, they are in no mood to annoy the Russians. Although one must quickly correct any exaggerated impression one may be getting from the above of the emergence of two clearly defined blocks in the this region. There are still mutual tensions and mistrusts between most of the partners of the group containing Iran and Russia. Turkey still has would be ready to be identified with block that consists Iran, Russia and Armenia however Turkey and Iran are much closer than year ago. There disagreements on a number of issues still needs to be solved, but they perceive a complimentarity of interests on Afghanistan and Caspian and Central Asian energy and trade routes. Americans also are not ready to openly be identified with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan only. These states also have some intra-group rivalries about routes. Peoples Republic of China, although an important player of the energy game, can not be easily identified with one of the emerging regional divisions. However, China is being taken as a rival by the western companies both as, i.e. investor and as a market. While Pakistan is still bogged down in Afghanistan, other players are making their moves and have moved quite far in the game. Apparently one fails to see much chance of Pakistan's catching up, given our inability to respond quick enough to the changes and lack of vision and maneuverability. Pakistan's Central Asian policy, if there is one, hangs on its Afghan policy, which in turn depends on Taliban and American policy of containment of Iran. Under this policy United States announced sanctions against all companies, whether American or not, that does business with Iran That policy has been under attack inside America, with increasing vigor, since President Khatami's election, late last year. Americans although had quickly backtracked on their public withdrawal of the policy of sanctions against foreign firms dealing with Iran, is apparently not doing much to implement it. As Frederick Starr put it in his congressional testimony earlier this year, "French, Indonesian and Russian firms are already investing in the construction of oil facilities and pipelines in Iran and the U.S. seems disinclined to intervene against them. Iran itself is busy constructing a line linking Turkmenistan and Turkey. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have worked out swap deals with Tehran, by which Central Asia ships its crude oil to Iran's north and Iran then exports the same quantity of its own oil from the south. In short, the American quarantine of 1995-6 is not holding" Pakistan's only visible and concrete, expected gain in this whole game were the plans of a pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan. Just when Taliban are apparently poised to take over the whole of Afghanistan, UNOCAL [the American company who is leading the international consortium constructing that pipeline] has announced the suspension of its plans to construct the much trumpeted pipeline. This victory about which we are expected to believe as the success of our Afghan policy has brought Iran and Taliban to the verge of armed conflict. That conflict has the potential of pushing Pakistan into a quagmire, getting out of which would be impossible for her. The increasing tension between Iran and Afghanistan is something that can not be ignored by Pakistan. But Pakistan can not also afford getting involved in any real conflict with Iran due to both strategic and economic considerations. Strategically Pakistan always wished a government in Afghanistan which should not be friendly with India and not hostile to her, at the least. The reason for that has been, with an unfriendly government in Kabul, Pakistan would always feel vulnerable from the north in case of conflict with India. Can Pakistan afford such a threat from a better equipped and better trained Iran replacing Afghanistan in such a situation?. Economically a conflict between Iran and Afghanistan would mean to say the least a continued strife in Afghanistan. Hence, the desire to get to the central Asian markets and resources would not be satisfied. And more importantly if Pakistan is seen as continuously supporting Taliban in that conflict, can she foot the bill for continued support of Taliban? Or are our planners banking on Saudi Arabians and Americans for it. Keeping in mind the post nuclear blasts economic crunch, the American sanctions, and Saudi limitations on helping us out, how much can these traditional sources of support for our Afghan adventures be counted upon? And if they do foot the bill of our conflict with Iran what would they expect in return. Keeping in mind our extremely weak bargaining position? This is in no way a suggestion for totally abandoning Taliban, but to really re-orient our Afghanistan policy. While thinking about Afghanistan our policy managers must take a much bigger view. It must be understood that our policy in Afghanistan will have a direct bearing on our ability to play on the central Asian chess board, in the South Asian arena, in our standing in the Middle East and the rest of the world. A little compromising attitude from Iran would mean the total abandonment of the present half hearted American policy of containing Iran. And to understand, what that would mean for us needs no extra-ordinary vision or intelligence. We would be left with only Taliban in the region, who very frankly, must be remembered are Afghans after all. And like all Afghans would know how to bargain, understanding well our compulsions and increasingly limited choices. Rather than going for a total control which is not possible, [keeping in mind Afghan history both ancient and recent, re-enforced by our experiences with Taliban assertion over their territory] Our policy makers must strive for solution that takes care of legitimate Russian Iranian, Turkmen, Turkish, Uzbek, Tajik and Kyrghiz interests. Pakistan must strive hard to play the role of a honest broker between Iran and Taliban, on the one side and also try to allay the fears of other interested regional states about them and its own intentions through them. Even at this belated stage it is better to compromise than to go for the whole. It would be understandably difficult for our leadership to give up what it had wanted always [i.e. the control of the whole of Afghanistan by our chosen group]. Hard as it may be there is no other way to pay for the mistakes of our past Afghan policy. It must be clearly understood that the total victory of Taliban in Afghanistan will be at very heavy unaffordable cost to Pakistan's regional and international interests.